Pakistan enters a new year teetering on the brink of a financial abyss. The much touted reason for this misfortune is the unbridled corruption of preceding governments. Ending corruption and recovering stolen wealth remains a pipe dream; corruption soars and the national debt reaches a new high. An impoverished populace waits resignedly and prays for a new Messiah who will deliver it from misery. Those unable to wait for deliverance jump off roofs or hang themselves.
Glory will never come to Pakistan. There is no savior. Any new incumbent will glibly repeat the mantra of inheriting a mess created by an inept and corrupt predecessor. The nation will be told to brace itself for another round of deprivation. Pakistanis shall acquiesce and prostrate themselves, questioning the Creator why they remain denied His munificence. The nation shall remain oblivious of the real reason for its misfortune. It is not corruption, ineptitude, or any of the myriad reasons we ascribe to our failure. Our downfall is simply and purely the outcome of Pride. We are a sinfully proud people and we need to recognize this fatal flaw in our psyche because if we do not, the fall that follows is approaching fast.
The following two-part article forces this recognition and then suggests a possible course of action to regain our balance and avoid falling into oblivion.

PART I – RECOGNIZING PRIDE

Pakistanis are exhibitionists by nature. We like to project our status and proclaim our importance. We may have to beg, borrow or steal but we must present an image that impresses others. This societal ill extends to the national level where it manifests itself as a proclivity for ceremony, impressive offices, palatial residences, gilded furniture, obscenely gaudy fixtures and fittings, luxury cars, rare cuisine, rarer pets. We mask our poverty in fake designer dresses, black market copies of expensive brands, life expired imported food. We splurge to create ostentatious movies, videos and audios that broadcast our glory.
We are a proud people. Even while we go around the world, begging bowl in hand, we wallow in an inordinate amount of pride. Naked, shivering, starving we may be, but we are a nation of proud people. We go a step further; we equate Pride with Honor and defend it with ferocity.

To be fair, we have two very substantial reasons for being proud. One is that we are the only Muslim Nation that has a nuclear arsenal, and the other is that we possess the finest Military in the World. While the first is a valid, irrefutable claim, there are many nations that claim the second distinction. Let us assume that they are all wrong and that we indeed have the World’s finest Armed Forces. It is therefore not unreasonable to boast about these enviable attributes. And we do. We adorn our cities with replicas of the Chagai mountain; our public transport is emblazoned with military hardware and personalities; even our donkey carts carry crude drawings of our weapon systems. Our media broadcasts haunting melodies in praise of our warriors; our film producers make movies and serials that glorify military life. As we do so, we ignore one important fact. Pride has a price tag. We remain blissfully ignorant of the cost of our Pride. We have never questioned the cost of our pride; we have never bothered to put a dollar value to becoming a nuclear nation or fielding the finest armed forces of the world. It is time for us to undertake this exercise. Let us begin by figuring out what it might have cost to become the world’s finest military.

Let us examine the world’s finest Air Force. We have ample reason to be proud of it. It has built an indigenous fighter aircraft which is comparable to the F16. Our very own Air Superiority Fighter, the JF-17 Thunder. It is worthwhile putting a dollar value to the 100 plus strong fleet of JF-17s that has been added to the PAF inventory. An apt reference is the United Arab Emirates acquisition of a package of eighty specially configured F16 aircraft which were conceived, developed and financed entirely by the miniscule kingdom. That cost is documented as approximately 8 billion dollars which translates to 100 million dollars per aircraft. In FY 2000 dollars. This cost per aircraft is typical; when India contemplated adding 114 F16s to its inventory, the bill presented was approximately 15 billion dollars. Our own acquisition of the first complement of 40 F16s paid for in FY1984 dollars cost about the same. We can predict how much our fleet of the JF17 may have cost Pakistan. That acquisition is but one of many that the PAF has carried out in the past two decades. We have added many more assets to its inventory. More F-16s, additional transport aircraft, armed helicopters, Airborne Early Warning Platforms, AWACS, Electronic Warfare aircraft, in-flight refuellers, drones, Ground Surveillance Radars, smart air to surface weapons, smarter surface to air missiles, intelligent ground support systems, computers, software and so on. And, yes; executive jets for VIP travel. We have also recruited and trained additional manpower, built new infrastructure, commissioned new bases etc. And yes;, golf courses.

Acquisition costs are the smaller part of the overall cost of an Air Force. The bigger chunk is the operational cost. Purchasing hardware is a one-time expense; employing it and keeping it ready for war is an expense that drains the nation’s coffers. Manpower, training, support equipment, weapons, spares, system updates, configuration changes, hangars, offices, buildings, vehicles; these are some of the recurring expenses. Fuel is yet another major cost. You can find out the price of a liter of jet fuel through the internet but don’t bother calculating the volume of jet fuel the PAF burns each year. Just know that an F16 aircraft in full afterburner burns roughly 600 liters per minute. That is 10 liters of jet fuel. Per Second.

Using Google, Wikipedia and the latest PAF calendar it is possible to arrive at a very rudimentary and necessarily inaccurate cost of owning the finest air force of the world. The Air Force is just one element of our defense capability. One needs to conduct similar calculations to figure out what it costs to field the world’s finest Navy and Army. Only then is it possible to determine a rough cost we have paid for the pride we have in our Armed Forces.
Calculating the cost of our second pride of being the world’s only Muslim Nuclear Power is not easy; there is very little data available on our capability. This said, it is possible to arrive at a meaningful estimate by using information available in the public domain. Most nations publish military budgets which include allocations for their nuclear programs. There are also independent research organizations that evaluate inventories and track costs of nuclear weapons. Their published data can be used as a reference.
• Air launched cruise missiles carried by fighter/bomber aircraft cost about $1 million each.
• The price of a land-based ICBM is approximately 50 million US dollars.
• The cost of a submarine launched ballistic missile is approximately USD 200 million.
• Missile silos and mobile launching systems cost about 15 million dollars each. Maintaining one costs roughly 3 million dollars per year.
• A typical R&D allocation for a missile program is USD 5 billion.
• The annual cost of maintaining a 60-unit strong Nuclear Ballistic Missile Force has been listed as 1.2 billion dollars.
• France spends approximately 3.0 billion dollars each year on its nuclear arsenal which consists of 4SSBNs, 48 SLBMs with 288 warheads and about 100 air launched supersonic missiles each having a payload of 300 Kilotons.
• Defence analysts estimate that Israel spends about a billion dollars each year for the maintenance of its nuclear warheads and IRBMs.
• The United States plans to replace its entire nuclear arsenal over the next two decades. The estimated cost of that plan is $60 billion.

I have no idea of the actual numbers of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads or missiles. Nor do you. Nor indeed do most Pakistanis. Listed on the web however are Pakistani missile systems. They carry powerful, emotive, patriotic names such as Hatf, Shaheen, Ghauri, Ghaznavi, Nasr, Abdali, Fath, Ghazab, Ababil, Zarb, Harbah, Babur, Raad, Barq etc. Some are designed to hit targets at a distance of a few kilometers, others have an intercontinental reach. The warheads they carry are purported to have yields of single to four digits. Using the financial costs referenced above, and hazarding a guess at our numbers, it is possible to estimate what our second pride of being the only Nuclear Armed Muslim State may have cost.

Once all the calculations are over, the question you must logically ask is “Where did all that money come from?” Don’t do that. Never do that. You may end up in a very uncomfortable place. All you need to do is compare your calculated figure to the national debt. Understanding will dawn.
There is no such thing as ‘a free meal’. Everything costs. Capability cannot be developed by that wondrous military phrase used often to secure approval for its desires, ‘no cost to the National Exchequer’. Buy something, pay through your hand. Buy something secretly, pay through your nose. That’s Blackmarketing 101.

When payment has to be made in local currency, the problem is minor; paper money can be printed. Foreign purchases need to be paid in hard currencies. Dollars can only be earned through export or home remittances. Pakistan has historically never been able to collect enough through these means. The nation borrows. To pay its bills. To fuel its Pride.
Understand Pride. Be proud but know that it is your pride that keeps the nation illiterate, impoverished and underdeveloped. And do not forget the undeniable truth that Pride always precedes a Fall. Most importantly, recognize that the fall is nigh. Acknowledge that the nation is about to topple over.

PART II – AVERTING THE FALL

Part I of this article identifies Pride as the main reason for our economic woes and suggests that the fall that follows pride is at hand. The world’s only Muslim nuclear power which has the world’s finest military is on its knees, begging for a pittance; a mere billion dollars. The government and its financial wizards are hostage to this financial groveling only because the alternate is too devastating to even contemplate. Everyone knows that the way out of our financial quagmire is the creation of wealth but nobody has yet been able to define a meaningful mechanism for doing so. Suggestions range from building toilets along tourist routes to cultivating narcotics.
Pakistan has only one practical means of creating wealth. It is a stunningly simple one. Pakistan just needs to swallow its Pride.

The pride we have in our nuclear arsenal is easy to overcome. It simply requires a reduction of chest beating and bluster. By now we should have acquired the required stockpile of warheads and delivery systems we need. All we need to do is keep quiet about it.

Getting rid of the pride we have in our Armed Forces is not easy. It requires an extremely drastic measure. Pakistan needs to get rid of its Armed Forces. The Army, Navy, Air Force and all the paramilitary, quasi military forces need to be disbanded. The stark, uncomfortable truth which has finally been acknowledged publicly by our leadership is that our Armed Forces cannot defend the nation in a conventional cross border war. It has also been amply demonstrated that they routinely fail to counter the war that rages within our borders.

An intruding force can penetrate our defenses and ingress almost 200 kilometers deep inside our territory, operate in a major city for over three hours, and yet the world’s finest Air Force can shrug off the incident by simply stating that the ‘visitors came stealthily’. The most wanted man in the world can live in comfort in a garrison city deep within our borders and the finest Intelligence agency of the world can blithely state that it ‘did not know’. A debilitating terrorist attack can take place on a secure Naval installation within a military fortress and our Naval Chief can express helplessness because ‘the attackers were highly trained’. A horrendous mass murder of innocent schoolchildren can take place deep within an Army garrison only to be shrugged off as ‘collateral damage’ in a war on terror. A group of misguided fanatics can challenge the writ of the government, bring the nation to a grinding halt, and our Army sallies forth, hurling bundles of money at the miscreants to purchase a ceasefire.

Worse follows. Each Service demands additional funds to combat these purportedly novel and unpredictable threats. A civilian government, uneducated in military matters, unable to question and unwilling to confront, puts national development and economic growth on hold and diverts its scant resources towards the three Services. Funds are allocated for rescuing downed pilots landing in hostile areas, for transporting troops in safety within landmine infested areas and for patrolling the vulnerable shores of our beleaguered nation. An Air Force acquires executive helicopters, an Army purchases luxurious SUVs; a Navy imports a luxury yacht. Harsh words but unfortunately true.

For Pakistan to recover from its economic tailspin, it needs to get rid itself of the archaic institutions of its Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Services organization and all its paramilitary and quasi-military forces. In their place Pakistan needs to institute a fully integrated, singular, Unified Military Command.

It is delusional to suggest that our three Services are already integrated; after all we have a Joint Services Headquarters that ensures this. The truth is that each Service pursues goals and capability development in isolation and, in quite a few cases, in total secrecy. Inter-service rivalry has taken a darkly negative turn and is beyond repair. Integrating all military, paramilitary and quasi-military assets is only possible by scrapping the old and bringing in a new Unified Command structure. Done properly, a leaner, better and much more cost effective defence force can emerge. That new force shall engender a dramatic reduction in our defence budget, without compromising any capability whatsoever. Indeed, there will be an enhancement of capability and a simultaneous release of an unbelievably large pool of skilled manpower, equipment, infrastructure and real estate assets which can be employed in pursuits that create national wealth. To understand this assertion some amplification is necessary.

• The Pakistan Air Force is the primary agency responsible for defense of the nation’s airspace. The Pak Army has, nonetheless, developed its own air power to support the land battle. The Navy has its own air power to support a sea battle that may never be fought. The Naval Air Arm is not yet complete because its requirement for having its own fighter aircraft squadron is yet to be funded.
• Each Service has its own airfields and bases. Where two or more Services operate in one facility, the real estate is physically divided and within each division each Service creates its own, duplicate or triplicate servicing, maintenance and repair facilities.
• Air Defence of Pakistan is the responsibility of the PAF. However, the Pak Army has its own Air Defense Command which duplicates the Air Force effort to provide a separate air defense cover over the battlefield area. The Navy has its own air defense assets for protection of both its ships and static shore installations. Each Service has acquired its own hardware for detection and defense, radars, missiles, anti-aircraft guns and, perforce, command and control systems. Each Service fields its own surface to air missile defenses even when co-located at one geographical location. More often than not, the systems are different and incompatible. Expensive hardware and software is required to achieve interoperability and prevent fratricide.
• Each service has its own ground combat troops. Even though the Pak Army has its legendary commandos to protect national assets, the PAF and Navy have found it necessary to have their own troops to protect their installations.
• The three Services have a degree of commonality of aircraft, hardware, software, vehicles and the like. Yet, each service has its own support and maintenance facilities. Common inventories do not mean combined purchases. Each service has its own procurement organizations, its own depots, separate inventories for identical assets. One Service can be hurting for spares while another has plentiful stocks sitting on its shelves. From major aircraft systems to household glue, each service procures identical items independently, often at widely differing prices. Embassies abroad have procurement teams from each service that manage their acquisitions in isolation, often dealing with the same supplier. Similar duplication exists locally. The Air Force procures its own camouflage cloth, the Navy its own, the Army its own. It is not uncommon to have three different camouflage patterns and colors in the same environment. It is also not uncommon to have all three stick out against that completely different background.
• Time was when all three services were supplied fuel, oil and lubricants by the Army. Not any more. Each procures its own.
• Provision of Civil Engineering services used to be the domain of the Pak Army through the aptly termed Military Engineering Services (MES). Each Service now has its own establishments, manpower and facilities.
• Gone are the days when the Army provided doctors and paramedical staff for all three services. Each service has developed its own medical facilities. An individual from one service cannot, as a matter of routine, seek treatment in another Service’s premises. Combined Medical Hospitals are no longer combined. Multiple medical facilities exist at one geographical location. There are many military hospitals within one metropolitan area, each catering to a specific Service. Some are understaffed. A specialist may be available at an one Service hospital while a critical patient may go untreated at that of another Service.
• Drugs and medicines which were once procured centrally are now sourced separately by each service; each one purchasing from different suppliers; at different prices.

• Each Service has its own meteorological facilities; the Army determines its own weather, the Air Force its own and the Navy its own.
• Each Service has its own Media Organizations. Each one produces elaborate audio and video products that proclaim its individual greatness.
• The Navy has aircraft, the Air Force and Army have boats. The Navy has Armored Personnel Carriers. So does the Air Force.
• Each Service has its own Academies, training institutions, flying training schools, engineering colleges, Staff Colleges, War Colleges and Universities.
The list is endless. It spills over to housing, welfare, social and extracurricular activities.
• Each service has its own colleges, its own schools, its own social groups and youth development organizations.
• Each Service has its own housing schemes.
• Each has its own Welfare Foundation, its own businesses.
• Each has its own public schools and cadet colleges.
• Each has its own golf courses.
• Its own wives clubs.
• Own stud farms.
• Graveyards.

Individualism costs. It needs multiplicity of manpower and material resources. A completely new organization is then created to ensure coordination, joint planning and joint execution. The Joint Service Headquarters that straddles the three Armed Forces is grossly ineffective and completely unnecessary. It is a motley collection of personnel from each Service deputed to perform cosmetic, nugatory tasks. The three Services also position individual representatives in government organizations and ministries, each conducting identical but compartmentalized functions. Where one individual would suffice, three are positioned. To clear imports of military hardware arriving through Karachi ports, three different customs clearing agencies are needed. Three different uniforms are required to adorn the backdrop of the President and Prime Minister.
There is an ongoing turf war between the three Services which have become sharply polarized and jealously possessive. Mutual distrust has replaced healthy inter-service rivalry. It is for these reasons that monumental blunders such as Kargil, Abbotabad, Mehran and APS happen. Each Service fights tooth and nail with the other two in order to secure as big a chunk of the defence budget as possible. Size matters and, not unnaturally, in all such encounters, the Army
dominates. Any sharing of money or other benefits be they medals, land, Hajj and Umra trips, military attaches in embassies; all is carried out in the ratio of size; the PAF and PN getting modest percentages. Resentment deepens, Jealousy takes an ugly turn. An arrogant, unintelligent Air Marshall refuses to respond to the desperate plea for help by an ambitious, incompetent General. Thousands of soldiers die an unsung death, their remains scattered across a foreign, glacial landscape. The living are awarded medals. The shattered lives of parents, widows and orphans will take a long time to heal. A round of golf and a Cohiba will heal a bruised ego almost instantly.

The fix is simple. A singular military force. Unified Command. We need to scrap our outdated organograms, orders of precedence and chains of command. We need to reorganize our military into one singular defense force with one single Headquarter. There are many compelling reasons for this but the overriding one is that it is no longer possible for a cash strapped government to fund multiple Services.

The benefits are enormous. Everything reduces to one. Training schools, academies, staff colleges, service headquarters, regional commands, Directorates of Procurement, Audit, Accounting, Estates and Land management, Bases, Cantonments, Messes, Barracks, Housing Societies; everything. Manpower can be trimmed by eliminating duplicate, triplicate and even quadruplicate systems. By standardizing uniforms, dovetailing training, integrating logistics, aggregating assets and synchronizing their employment three disparate forces can be melded into a homogenous whole The entire spectrum of Pakistan’s military activity can be made more potent; more meaningful. Equally importantly, Unification of Command the immense resources that are freed, both human and material, can be channeled into nation building and generating wealth.

Perhaps the most important benefit of having a singular Defence Force is that it shall ensure Unity of Thought. Today, each service has its own parochial perception of when, where and how the Battle for Pakistan is to be fought. The Navy believes that India can be tamed by fielding a blue water navy equipped with aircraft carriers and submarines carrying nuclear tipped missiles. The PAF believes that airborne early warning platforms, sky-based command centers and a lightning strike capability are the only means of protecting Pakistan while the Army continues to harbor the belief that one bold, furtive adventure can liberate Kashmir. Each Service has its own perception of military strategy.
Switching to a Unified Military Command does not require any extraordinary effort or funds. It simply needs an honest admission that we can no longer sustain our present defence structure. Borrowing is no longer an option for Pakistan. Nor is the invoking of patriotism in our dual nationals. Pakistan needs restructure its Military. It needs to constitute a team of competent analysts and planners who can develop a rational and enduring transition plan for creating a Unified Military Command. It will take time; the gestation period will span a few years.

January 1st, 2022 might be a good day to sow the seed.